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Abstract
In the context of India, water is historically stored on the surface in small reservoirs
which also recharge shallow groundwater aquifers. There is a strong evidence that such
structures have the potential to achieve a wide range of societal goals. Nevertheless, despite
its obvious potentials, many communities fail to manage structures sustainably. In the
context of watershed projects the water infrastructure works well as long as there is external
facilitation but cooperation in maintenance often breaks down as soon as projects come to
an end.
This experimental study helps to better understand cooperation patterns in Rajasthan
communities using and managing small village reservoirs. In addition, this study is in-
tended to create awareness amongst farmers for the cooperation challenge and encourage
discussions related to it. Experimental approaches have the potential to facilitate dialogue,
shared learning, collective decision making, and strengthening the adaptive management
capacity of local communities.
We played framed public good experiments with 300 community leaders and other local
stakeholders. We introduced communication and social information in terms of revealing
the players’ decisions. The discussion was a critical element of our game as it allowed
the players to start negotiations and propose rules. We further introduced institutional
mechanisms as additional treatments.
Our results suggest that participants were able to generate solutions that are substanti-
ally better than the predictions of standard economic theory even under private decision
making without communication. Introducing information and revealing the individual be-
haviour increases investments significantly. Players who agree to rules but also those who
propose a punishment invest higher amounts. Introducing the opportunity to sanction fel-
low players also increased investments even though those who were punished reduced their
contributions.
The discussions showed that the players connected the game to their real life experiences.
They highlighted challenges but gave also examples where cooperation in the community is
working well. The game sessions were a revelation for the community that led to a learning
process.
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